19 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |