17 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |