Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root'', 'Mind and Body' and 'fragments/reports'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]