20 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
| 4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
| 3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
| 4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
| 3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
| 4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |