55 ideas
12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |
12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |