Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Positive Philosophy', 'Mind and Body' and 'Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
All ideas must be understood historically [Comte]
Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte]
Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte]
Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women have no role in politics [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Human life is pointless without justice [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]