23 ideas
19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
18085 | Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy] |
18084 | When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |