Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions', 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' and 'Truth-makers and dependence'

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44 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine]
To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon]
If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine]