67 ideas
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |