112 ideas
| 14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
| 14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
| 14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
| 14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
| 14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
| 14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
| 14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
| 14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
| 14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
| 14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
| 14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
| 14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
| 14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
| 14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| 14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
| 10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
| 14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
| 14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
| 14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
| 22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
| 22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
| 22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
| 22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
| 14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
| 14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
| 14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
| 14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
| 14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
| 22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
| 5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
| 14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
| 14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
| 22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
| 14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
| 14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
| 14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
| 14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
| 14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
| 14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
| 14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
| 5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
| 5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
| 14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
| 5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
| 5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
| 5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
| 5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
| 22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |