58 ideas
15382 | Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago] |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |