70 ideas
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| 22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
| 14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
| 7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
| 7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
| 22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
| 22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
| 22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
| 22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
| 7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
| 7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
| 7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
| 7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
| 7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
| 7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
| 7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
| 7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
| 7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
| 7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
| 7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
| 22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
| 7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
| 7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
| 7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
| 7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
| 5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
| 7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
| 7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
| 7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
| 22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| 22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
| 7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |
| 22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
| 5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
| 5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
| 5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
| 5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
| 5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
| 5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
| 5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
| 22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |