Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Meaning' and 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10702 Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
10713 Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13044 Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10708 Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
13546 The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10707 Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10704 We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
10703 Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
10712 If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17882 It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
13043 A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
13042 If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13041 Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
10709 Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
22167 Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
22117 Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
22118 Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4348 Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
7821 Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22119 Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
22116 Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
19338 Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]