63 ideas
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
1515 | Pythagoreans believe it is absurd to seek for goodness anywhere except with the gods [Iamblichus] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |