Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' and 'Of liberty, Fate and God's grace'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
13082 The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
22167 Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
22117 Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
22118 Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4348 Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
7821 Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22119 Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
22116 Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
19338 Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]