44 ideas
| 8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| 8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
| 22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
| 8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
| 8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
| 8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
| 8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
| 8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
| 4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
| 22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
| 22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
| 22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
| 22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
| 22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
| 22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
| 22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
| 5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
| 22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
| 8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
| 8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
| 5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
| 22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
| 5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
| 5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
| 5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
| 5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
| 5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
| 22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| 5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |