Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'In Defence of Pure Reason'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


55 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine]
To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon]
If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine]