Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Morality, Action, and Outcome' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
22167 Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
22117 Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
22118 Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4348 Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
7821 Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22470 A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22468 Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
22469 Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22119 Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
22116 Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
19338 Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]