58 ideas
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
13520 | A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS] |
13524 | Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
13522 | Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS] |
13521 | Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS] |
13523 | Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
13529 | Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS] |
13526 | Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS] |
13534 | In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS] |
13535 | First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
13519 | Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS] |
13533 | First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS] |
13531 | Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS] |
13532 | Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS] |
13537 | An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS] |
13539 | The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS] |
13538 | If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS] |
13525 | Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS] |
13530 | An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS] |
13518 | Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS] |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |