Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On the Individuation of Attributes' and 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


30 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]