60 ideas
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
23125 | Most good social changes are incremental, rather than revolutionary [Gopnik] |
23126 | Conservatives often want peace, prosperity and tolerance, but not social fairness [Gopnik] |
23132 | Conservatives believe obedience and rank are essential to social order [Gopnik] |
23128 | The opposite of liberalism is dogmatism [Gopnik] |
23142 | People are fallible, so liberalism tries to distribute power [Gopnik] |
23143 | Liberals have tried very hard to build a conscience into their institutions [Gopnik] |
23141 | Left-wingers are inconsistent in their essentialist descriptions of social groups [Gopnik] |
23124 | Liberal community is not blood ties or tradition, but shared choices, and sympathy for the losers [Gopnik] |
23127 | Liberal community includes flight from the family, into energetic reforming groups [Gopnik] |
23129 | Right-wingers attack liberal faith in reason, left-wingers attack its faith in reform [Gopnik] |
23133 | Cosmopolitan liberals lack national loyalty, and welcome excessive immigration [Gopnik] |
23138 | Modern left-wingers criticise liberalism's control of culture [Gopnik] |
23139 | Liberalism's attempt to be neutral and colour-blind erases cultural identities [Gopnik] |
23135 | Classic Marxists see liberalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie [Gopnik] |
23140 | Environmental disasters result not from capitalism, but from a general drive for growth [Gopnik] |
23130 | Popular imperialism gives the poor the belief that their acts have world historical meaning [Gopnik] |
23131 | Patriots love their place, but nationalists have a paranoid ethnic hostility [Gopnik] |
23136 | Liberal free speech is actually paid speech [Gopnik] |
23134 | A 'free' society implies a free market, which always produces predatory capitalism and inequalities [Gopnik] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |