10 ideas
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |