14 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |