13 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |