11 ideas
| 8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
| 8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
| 17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |