40 ideas
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |