Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Senses of Essence' and 'On the Source of Necessity'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11178 The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11175 Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11176 The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
17743 De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
11174 A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177 Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]