11 ideas
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
| 5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
| 5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |