19 ideas
8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |