63 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |