Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaontology of Abstraction', 'Philosophy of Natural Science' and 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
12295 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
12298 Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12296 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
18882 You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
12297 Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
21507 Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]