Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaontology of Abstraction', 'Critical Common-Sensism' and 'How to Define Theoretical Terms'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
14797 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
14798 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]