16 ideas
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |