30 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
20086 | Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck] |
20090 | Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck] |
20087 | There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck] |
20089 | Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck] |
20088 | Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck] |
20085 | Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck] |
20095 | A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck] |
20094 | You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck] |
20093 | In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck] |
20091 | Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck] |