111 ideas
14857 | The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche] |
14854 | Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche] |
14833 | Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
14853 | Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche] |
24075 | Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
14562 | A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14541 | Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
14553 | Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
14538 | Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum] |
14555 | Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum] |
14557 | Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14583 | Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum] |
14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
14584 | The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum] |
14582 | Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14542 | If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum] |
14535 | Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14561 | Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum] |
14579 | Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum] |
14580 | Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum] |
14552 | Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum] |
14578 | Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum] |
14549 | Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14858 | Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche] |
14585 | We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum] |
14830 | Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche] |
14576 | Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum] |
14551 | If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum] |
14571 | The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum] |
14570 | Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14569 | It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum] |
14568 | A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum] |
20378 | Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche] |
14556 | Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
14820 | People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche] |
14856 | Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche] |
14842 | Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche] |
14835 | Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche] |
22473 | Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
14807 | The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche] |
14823 | Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche] |
14824 | It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche] |
14812 | Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche] |
14810 | Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche] |
14831 | No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche] |
14855 | Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche] |
14815 | We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche] |
14849 | We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche] |
14818 | First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche] |
20103 | You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche] |
14817 | The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche] |
14809 | All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche] |
14816 | Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche] |
20112 | Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche] |
14821 | Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche] |
14841 | Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche] |
14843 | Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche] |
14811 | In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche] |
20111 | We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche] |
14844 | People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche] |
14808 | Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche] |
14822 | If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche] |
14838 | The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche] |
14852 | Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche] |
14846 | If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche] |
14819 | Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche] |
14847 | Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche] |
14814 | Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche] |
14836 | People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche] |
14845 | Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche] |
14848 | Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche] |
14839 | Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche] |
14834 | Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche] |
14566 | Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum] |
14577 | Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14563 | Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14587 | We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum] |
14533 | Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum] |
14558 | A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum] |
14559 | Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14565 | Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum] |
14567 | Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum] |
14537 | Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum] |
14573 | Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum] |
14572 | Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14574 | Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum] |
14539 | Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14550 | We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14546 | Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum] |
14825 | In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche] |
14575 | A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum] |
14548 | There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum] |
14554 | Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14564 | If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum] |
14826 | Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche] |
14827 | The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche] |
14813 | Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche] |
14832 | The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche] |
14850 | Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche] |
14837 | Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche] |
14828 | Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche] |