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All the ideas for 'The Metaontology of Abstraction', 'Metaphysical Dependence' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
14100 Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
14096 Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14097 Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14095 Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14093 An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14099 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
14098 An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]