17 ideas
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
| 2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
| 9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
| 9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |