15 ideas
15970 | People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
8942 | Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
9410 | Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman] |
18530 | Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman] |
17707 | We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares] |