Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaontology of Abstraction', 'Reliabilism' and 'Truth-maker Realism: response to Gregory'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

14 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
12223 It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18470 Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
12225 Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12224 Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12226 The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12229 Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18443 A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
19727 Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19725 In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa]
19726 How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
12227 Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
12228 Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]