14 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |