Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaontology of Abstraction', 'What's Wrong with Rape?' and 'Natural Kinds'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
A rape disregards the status of being a person - but so does all assault [Foa]
Rape of children is dreadful, but no one thinks children should have a right of consent [Foa]
If men should lust and women shouldn't, that makes rape the prevalent sexual model [Foa]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]