18 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |