Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaontology of Abstraction', 'Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature?' and 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry]
A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry]