33 ideas
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
| 15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
| 15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
| 15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
| 15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |