15 ideas
7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |