Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essence and Potentiality', 'Finkish dispositions' and 'Apriority and Existence'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8859 The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
8865 If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
8863 We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
8862 Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
8864 We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8858 Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
8861 Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]