Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essence and Potentiality', 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense' and 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6253 Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13804 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
13805 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13808 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
13806 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13807 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
13809 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6256 Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
6252 Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
6257 You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
6254 We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
6255 Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]