15 ideas
13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |