12 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
20443 | The aesthetic attitude is nothing more than paying close attention [Dickie, by Giovannelli] |