Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essence and Potentiality', 'Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence' and 'On the Individuation of Attributes'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
9148 I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18441 No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
18440 Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
9152 If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9149 To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K]
9150 We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9146 After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K]